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Abstract 
This article contributes to the international corporate governance literature by examining 
factors that affect CEO compensation in China.  The article models of CEO pay based on an 
understanding of the unique economic and structural reforms undertaken by the privatized State 
Owned Enterprises.  The findings show that CEO compensation depends, in part, on the firm’s 
operating profits and this indicates that incentive systems are being used to motivate top 
managers. Corporate governance factors have a significant impact on CEO compensation, but 
they do so in ways that differ from those in other countries.  Our conclusions are robust across 
different formulations of the basic model and they have public policy implications for China and 
other transitional economies that are moving away from state ownership of business enterprises. 
Keywords: Ownership ; board structure; executive compensation. 
  
 
 
 
 
How Ownership and Corporate Governance Influence  
Chief Executive Pay in China’s Listed Firms 
 
1. Introduction 
The literature documents well China’s economic reforms and the privatization of its industrial 
enterprises (e.g., Li et al., 2004). Paradoxically, strong economic growth, fueled by pent-up domestic 
demand and burgeoning exports, is accompanied by poor corporate performance using accounting 
and stock market measures of success (Chen et al., 1998). Three reasons put forward for firms’ poor 
performances are the government’s interference with commercial decisions, poor corporate 
governance, and the lack of incentives for top managers (Chen et al., 2006).  
This article sheds light on the incentive issue by examining the compensation of CEOs in 
China’s listed firms. In particular, we investigate whether a CEO’s pay depends on the firm’s 
performance and whether ownership and boardroom characteristics have an impact on both pay and 
the pay-for-performance relation. The article identifies the main influences on CEO pay and critique  
the apparent pay processes used by firms. Now is an opportune time to examine CEO compensation 
in China as the listed company experiment has been in operation for more than 10 years. We need to 
learn lessons from the past and make recommendations that will assist future policy making. 
The findings show a positive pay-performance relation in China when performance is 
measured as return on assets. Thus, firms reward their CEOs when their firms have good operating 
profits. In contrast, stock returns do not relate with CEO compensation. The article provides evidence 
that state ownership acts to reduce compensation levels and the presence of a foreign shareholder acts 
to increase pay levels. Foreign- invested firms have higher pay-for-performance sensitivities. Internal 
  
 
 
governance does have an impact on CEO compensation. Firms with large boards of directors pay 
their CEOs less, firms with a lot of non-executive directors are more likely to use performance-based 
pay, and a firm that has a joint CEO-chairman position is less likely to use performance-based pay.  
The article has the following structure. Section 2 provides a brief description of China’s 
privatization program and discusses how top executive reward systems have changed.  Section 3 
reviews the theoretical foundations of CEO pay and develops hypotheses about the determinants of 
executive compensation in China. Section 4 describes the research method.  Section 5 reports the 
empirical results. Section 6 discusses the results and Part 7 concludes the paper and discusses the 
policy implications and the limitations of the study.  
2. Institutional background 
 The reorganization of state owned enterprises (SOEs) is a key ingredient in the economic 
modernization of China. Here, the operational activities of many, but not all, SOEs are reorganized 
into companies with share capital and profit making objectives. Many of the corporatized enterprises 
have subsequently sold shares to the public (a process called privatization) and these shares have 
been listed on the stock market. However in many cases the government has retained a significant 
ownership stake1, which often amounts to effective control. In 2001 the government introduced a 
plan to sell off the state’s remaining shares in listed firms (the so-called second stage of privatization) 
but this was shelved after strong protests from private investors. The private investors were 
concerned that the sale of state shares would flood the market and stock prices would plummet. In 
2005 the government resurrected the plan to sell state shares in listed firms and made the plan more 
palatable for private investors by reducing the number of new IPOs (thereby reducing the supply of 
other new shares) and requiring firms to compensate private investors (the compensation will be 
                                                               
1 When the government keeps an ownership interest a more apt description is partial privatization. In common with other 
studies we use the more simple term privatization.   
  
 
 
mainly by way of issuing bonus shares). The reorganization of listed firms has been modeled on U.S. 
corporations in a bold  attempt to instill western-style discipline and incentives (Tam, 2000). For 
example, managers have more discretion in making business decisions and they are held accountable 
to stockholders rather than to the state and the political hierarchy. Evidence suggests that this 
objective has met with only partial success (Chen et al., 2006). 
After the economic reforms began, managers were given more autonomy and incentive pay 
systems began to appear (Groves et al., 1994). In the early 1980s the government introduced a 
contract responsibility system (CRS) for SOEs. Under the CRS, managers were rewarded if the 
SOE’s performance exceeded expectations (as laid out in the contract). Firms that earned higher 
profits than expected were able to retain the surplus and managers were paid bonuses based on that 
surplus. Although there were problems with the CRS (Chen et al., 1998) it did sow the seed for 
further developments in reward systems.  
In the early- and mid-1990s the top manager of the SOE (or unit of a SOE) became the CEO 
of the company once it listed and their pay was a function of the civil service grade that they 
occupied. Incentive and reward systems were considered to be quite weak during this time (see 
Huang and Zhang, 1995; Qian, 1995; Yang, 1998; and Zheng, 1998). As the reform process evolved, 
pay levels departed from civil service rates and became more varied across firms. An embryonic 
labor market has developed and CEO turnover is quite high (Firth et al., 2006). CEOs are 
increasingly being appointed from outside the firm. Managerial compensation is decided by the board 
of directors and does not need the approval of stockholders. During the time of our study, 
compensation committees did not exist. 
Share ownership by CEOs and executive directors is very low (Xu, 2004) and their main 
source of income is from cash compensation. In 1999, the government considered allowing listed 
firms to offer stock options to the CEO and other senior managers. However, after much debate, the 
  
 
 
government decided against allowing this practice. One reason for not allowing executive stock 
options is that there is no source from which to give shares to the executives who wish to exercise 
their options; treasury stock (share repurchases) is not allowed and any new issue of shares (to give to 
the executives) requires regulatory approval, which is difficult to get. The lack of executive stock 
options is one reason why share ownership by CEOs and top managers is so low. The absence of 
executive stock options removes one method of aligning the interests of managers and the 
shareholders (we note, however, that the use of stock options in the U.S. has been subject to criticism 
(Bebchuk and Fried, 2004)).  
A major prerequisite to having a vibrant stock market is good corporate governance. This is 
especially so in China where most listed firms have a dominant or controlling shareholder. To 
promote good corporate governance, China’s stock market regulator, the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC), issued The Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Firms in China. The 
Code lays out detailed standards to which firms should adhere and it is similar in many respects to 
codes of governance in other markets (e.g., Hong Kong, the U.K.). Despite the good intentions of the 
Code, there are conflicting views on how well they have been accepted or implemented by firms and 
there are also conflicting views on whether they have had a good effect on firms’ performances (Bai 
et al., 2003; Lin, 2000). . 
3. Theoretical foundation and hypotheses  
 Because relatively little is known about how top management compensation is actually set in 
Chinese listed firms our hypotheses are exploratory in nature. We draw upon our knowledge of 
China’s reforms to guide us in formulating the hypotheses and we buttress this with information 
gained from interviewing company officers. China’s corporate reforms are aimed at emulating 
practices in North America and Europe and so we draw on the international literature on executive 
pay in deriving the hypotheses. We focus on whether performance drives CEO pay (pay contingent 
  
 
 
on performance). Additional research questions are whether the type of share owner and the 
boardroom characteristics have an impact on pay and the pay-for-performance relation. 
3.1. Performance 
Senior managers in China were brought up in a socialist environment where economic 
efficiency and corporate profitability were secondary to fulfilling government objectives. With the 
transformation to a market economy it is imperative that these senior managers refocus their efforts 
on maximizing profits and shareholder value (Cragg and Dyck, 2000; Wolfram, 1998). In order to 
induce CEOs to maximize shareholder wealth, firms need to introduce efficient incentive systems. 
One such system is to tie remuneration to firm performance. This pay- for-performance link is a basic 
tenet of principal-agent theory (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). We hypothesize that the CEO’s 
compensation depends on the firm’s financial performance. The hypothesis is predicated on the 
following stylized facts. First, in the early part of the reforms there is documented evidence that top 
management pay in SOEs depends on performance (Groves et al., 1994; Mengistae and Xu, 2004). 
We believe this practice is expanded after the SOEs are privatized. Second, the intent of the reforms 
is to emulate practices in the U.S. and other capitalist countries, includ ing the adoption of 
performance-related pay for CEOs2. Third, sections 77 and 78 of The Code of Corporate Governance 
for Listed Firms in China states that a manager’s salary should reflect the company’s performance. 
The Code is very influential. The hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 1: A CEO’s compensation depends on the firm’s performance.  
                                                               
2 However, we note that some  empirical research in Britain, the U.S., and elsewhere, has resulted in mixed findings on the 
pay-for-performance relation (e.g., Conyon and Murphy, 2000; Core et al., 1999; Gregg et al., 1993).  
 
  
 
 
3.2. Ownership, governance structure, and CEO pay 
Corporate governance relates to the way a firm is directed and controlled. The form of the 
governance structure is important when ownership is separated from management. When managers 
are given considerable, if not unbridled, autonomy they may engage in self-serving behavior that 
detracts from shareholder wealth. In order to monitor and, where necessary, control the actions of 
professional managers, firms have developed governance and reporting mechanisms. In the case of 
top management pay, CEOs and executive directors have incentives to award themselves high levels 
of compensation. In response to possible excessive pay, Cadbury (1992), Hampel (1998), Greenbury 
(1995), and others, urge firms to adopt a set of recommended practices and decision-making 
mechanisms. Good corporate governance includes active oversight by investors and the appointment 
of independent directors. 
China’s listed firms have unique ownership structures. In almost all firms there is a dominant 
shareholder who has significant influence over the way a firm is run and on the appointment and pay 
of the CEO. Xu (2004) shows that, on average, the largest shareholder in a firm owns 43% of the 
issued shares, while the second largest owns  less than 5%; thus the largest shareholder usually has 
effective control of the firm. Furthermore, the state is the largest shareholder in many listed firms. For 
these firms, the CEO is often a state bureaucrat who is seconded to the firm (and who returns to the 
state ministry from whence they came when their term as CEO ends). As state bureaucrats receive 
relatively low salaries we believe that their pay as a CEO at a listed firm will be lower than the CEOs 
at firms where the controlling shareholder is not the state.  This leads to our second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: CEO pay is lower when the firm is controlled by the state.  
The state has been characterized as being a poor monitor of a firm’s financial performance 
because they are too detached from the firm (Shleifer, 1998). Moreover, the state may pressure the 
firm to pursue objectives other than profit maximization (e.g., to increase employment). These 
  
 
 
reasons suggest that state controlled firms are less likely to adopt performance-related pay schemes 
for the CEO. To test this relation we formulate the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2A: The positive relation between CEO pay and performance will be weaker in 
firms whose controlling shareholder is the state.  
In China, the major shareholder is considered to be an insider and this shareholder has a 
crucial say in the appointment and remuneration of the CEO. This power can lead to abuses unless 
there is effective monitoring by outside investors. In capitalist economies, outside investors monitor 
management actions and can take steps to discipline or remove poorly performing executives. The 
costs of this monitoring role are quite high, however, and so in practice it is only large investors who 
can afford to actively intervene in a company’s affairs (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1986; Khan et al., 2005). In contrast, when ownership is dispersed there is greater 
managerial power and CEOs can award themselves higher pay (Firth et al., 1999). While China has 
no direct equivalent to the type of institutional investors seen in the U.S., there are large outside 
shareholders who are independent of the largest shareholder. We hypothesize that these large outside 
investors will help constrain abuses that lead to ‘excessive’ CEO pay and they will encourage the use 
of performance-related compensation schemes. This leads to our third hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: There is a negative relation between CEO compensation and the voting strength 
of large outside investors.  
Hypothesis 3A: The positive relation between CEO pay and firm performance is stronger 
when large outside shareholders have higher ownership.  
Some Chinese listed firms are allowed to issue shares to international investors (these are 
called B-shares). In order to induce foreign investors to buy its shares, a firm is more likely to adopt 
international standards of governance and business practices. Foreign investors are likely to pressure 
firms to hire better qualified CEOs who have international experience. These managers are able to 
  
 
 
negotiate higher pay. We also believe that foreign investors will exert pressure on firms to use 
performance-related pay schemes to reward their CEOs. The two foreign investor hypotheses are:  
Hypothesis 4: There is a positive relation between CEO compensation and the presence of 
foreign ownership. 
Hypothesis 4A: The positive relation between CEO pay and firm performance will be stronger 
if the firm has foreign shareholders.  
The board of directors is responsible for the internal governance of firms and it has oversight 
over the CEO’s compensation. As a consequence of this, the characteristics of the board have been 
used to help explain top executive pay in North America, Europe, and many developed countries. For 
example, a more independent board may act to restrain ‘excessive’ CEO pay (Boyd, 1994; Lambert et 
al., 1993) and to insist on linking the pay to the firm’s performance. However, some studies find that 
independent directors inflate a CEO’s pay (Firth et al., 1999). This might arise because the 
independent non-executive directors use the high pay for the CEO as a comparison benchmark when 
they negotiate or renegotiate their remuneration at the firms or organizations where they work full-
time. Thus they have an incentive for average executive pay to rise. Large boards of directors are 
likely to have a wider level of expertise although they can become so unwieldy that they become 
ineffective in monitoring the CEO (Jensen, 1993). Core et al. (1999) find that large boards are 
associated with excessive CEO pay. Some firms have the same person occupying the positions of 
CEO and chairman of the board. In this circumstance, the CEO/chairman has a lot of power and this 
has the potential to lead to excessive pay that bears no resemblance to performance. The empirical 
evidence on CEO/chairman duality has reached mixed conclusions. For example, Core et al. (1999) 
find that duality leads to higher pay in the U.S., while Conyon (1997) finds no relation in his study of 
British firms.  
  
 
 
China’s listed firms have boards of directors and their duties and responsibilities are laid out 
in The Company Law of 1993 (as amended in 1999) and The Code of Corporate Governance. The 
duties and responsibilities are, on the face of it, similar to those in the U.S. Because research in other 
countries has reached no consensus on the impact of independence, board size, and CEO/chairman 
duality on CEO pay, we present our hypotheses in null form. The hypotheses are: 
Hypothesis 5: There is no relation between CEO pay and board independence (board size, 
duality). 
Hypothesis 6: The positive relation between pay and performance is not affected by board 
independence (board size, duality). 
4. Research method 
4.1. Sample 
Our sample consists of non- financial companies that are listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
stock exchanges throughout the years 1998 to 2000. The start date is the first year that listed 
companies were required to disclose top management compensation. We exclude financial companies 
because their financial characteristics are far different from other firms. Moreover, financial firms are 
subject to more regulation and this may have an impact on CEO pay. We use the company annual 
reports as our source of information for executive compensation, ownership, non-executive directors, 
board size, and CEO/chairman characteristics. As the independent variables are lagged values from 
year t-1 we need data from 1997. Accounting and  stock market data are obtained from the CSMAR 
Database. Missing annual reports and missing observatio ns on the CSMAR Database reduce the 
sample size. The final sample consists of 549 companies and 1647 firm-year observations. 
4.2.  Variables 
 The dependent variable is CEO PAY. Since 1998 listed firms have been required to disclose 
the compensation of the highest paid executive in the company and we use this as a proxy for the pay 
  
 
 
of the CEO. The CEO’s total cash compensation includes base salary, bonuses, and commissions 
(unfortunately the pay is not broken down into these components). Bonus pay is likely to be a 
function of firm performance, but the formula used and the actual bonus that is paid is not disclosed 
(bonus pay is aggregated into total pay). We use the natural log of the CEO PAY in the regression 
models. 
 We use two measures of performance, namely, return on assets (ROA), which is the operating 
profit divided by assets, and stock return (RETURN). The first measure, ROA, is more dependent on 
and more under the control of managers, and maximizing profitability is the goal or target that the 
CEO strives for. We use operating profit (also known as “core earnings”) rather than net income as 
the net income includes gains and losses from asset sales and inter-company transfers (also known as 
“non-core earnings”); these gains and losses from asset sales and transfers are often outside the 
control of the CEO and so we do not include them in our measure of performance (however, 
replications of our tests using net income gives similar results and conclusions to those based on 
operating profit). Problems with the return on assets measure include the encouragement of a short 
term or myopic outlook at the expense of longer-term profitability, and the manipulation of 
accounting numbers by managers (although operating profit is harder to manipulate than net income). 
The second measure, stock return, represents the benefits to shareholders. A characteristic of stock 
returns is that they are harder for managers to manipulate than earnings and they ostensibly measure 
the longer-term profitability of the firm. One drawback to the use of stock returns is that share prices 
are subject to the vagaries of the stock market and to changes in the macro-environment including 
interest rates, inflation, and commodity prices; these factors are outside the control of the managers. 
In our regressions we use lagged performance from year t-1 to explain cash compensation. Thus, 
CEO PAY is determined by performance in the prior year. As a sensitivity test, we rerun our analyses 
  
 
 
with contemporaneous performance measures; the results are broadly consistent with those derived 
from lagged measures of performance.  
 If the state is the major shareholder in a firm then the variable STATE is coded one (1) and 
zero (0) otherwise. We measure large outside investors as the collective percentage shareholdings of 
the second through tenth largest shareholders; this variable is designated OUTSIDE. Firms have to 
disclose the ten largest shareholders and the percentage of shares they own. The shareholders 
represented by OUTSIDE  are independent of the major shareholder and thus they can act as monitors 
of both the CEO and the major shareholder. Firms with foreign shareholders (FOREIGN) are coded 
one (1) and firms without are coded zero (0). 
 NONEXEC is the proportion of non-executive directors on the board. It was not until 2003 
that Chinese listed firms were required to have independent directors. We use non-executive 
directors as a proxy for independent directors. BOARD is the number of directors on the board. 
DUAL is an indicator variable capturing cases where the CEO and chairman are the same person 
(DUAL = 1) and where they are different (DUAL = 0). 
 The ownership and boardroom characteristics are measured at the beginning of the year and 
they appear as main effects in the regression models. They are also interacted with the two 
performance measures (ROA and RETURN); the interaction terms are used to test whether ownership 
and board characteristics have an effect on the pay-performance relation. The interaction terms using 
ROA as the measure of performance are ROA t-1*STATE, ROAt-1*OUTSIDE , ROA t-1*FOREIGN, 
ROA t-1*NONEXEC, ROA t-1*BOARD, and ROAt-1*DUAL. Interaction terms using RETURN t-1 are 
RETURNt-1*STATE, RETURNt-1*OUTSIDE, RETURNt-1*FOREIGN, RETURNt-1*NONEXEC, 
RETURNt-1*BOARD, and RETURN t-1*DUAL.    
We use two categories of control variables in our models. These categories are (a) operating 
characteristics, and (b) other control factors. The operating characteristics are firm size (SIZE), risk 
  
 
 
(RISK), growth opportunities (GROWTH), and debt (DEBT). Extensive research in many countries 
has shown that firm size is positively and significantly associated with compensation levels (Jensen 
and Murphy, 1990; Conyon, 1997; Firth et al., 1996, 1999). Complexity of the job, the skills required, 
the number of hierarchical structures, and the ability to pay, all point toward large firms paying their 
CEOs more. We take the natural log of the book asset value as our proxy for firm size and we 
measure it as at the beginning of the year.  
 Lippert and Moore (1994) and Lippert and Porter (1997) find CEO compensation is higher at 
firms with greater stock return volatility (risk). High business risk is passed down to the CEO (e.g., 
job tenure) and so higher compensation is demanded (Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999). In our model, 
RISK is defined as the standard deviation of the monthly stock returns of the company measured over 
the previous 12 months. Managers are often charged with developing growth opportunities for firms 
and in which case they should be rewarded for their success in this endeavor. We follow previous 
researchers (e.g., Lippert and Moore, 1994) and use lagged market value to book asset value as a 
proxy for growth opportunities (GROWTH). A firm with external debt is subject to monitoring by the 
debt holders and so CEOs face restrictions on their managerial discretion. John and John (1993) 
argue that pay policy can be used as a pre-commitment device to reduce the agency cost of debt. We 
therefore include DEBT as a control variable. DEBT is defined as the book value of the long-term 
debt to the book value of the shareholders’ equity. RISK, GROWTH, and DEBT are measured at the 
beginning of the year. 
Other control factors are included in the model to account for regional and industry 
differences (see Table 1 for the definitions of AREA and IND). AREAs 1 and 2 are more prosperous 
and have a higher cost of living than AREAs 3 and 4. Therefore we expect CEO compensation to be 
higher in AREAs 1 and 2. Industry is based on stock exchange classifications. Finally, YEAR is added 
to control for time. Table 1 lists the variables and definitions used in our study.  
  
 
 
Please Insert Table 1 Here 
4.3. Model 
We use regression analysis to test the relation between pay, performance, ownership, and 
boardroom variables. The general model is:  
CEO PAY = a + ß1 PERFORMANCE + ß2 OWNERSHIP +ß3 BOARDROOM +ß4 OPERATING 
CHARACTERISTICS +ß5 CONTROL FACTORS + e           (1) 
5. Empirical results 
5.1.  Sample characteristics 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on compensation, firm size characteristics, the six 
categories of variables proposed to explain managerial compensation, and the operating 
characteristics. The median CEO compensation ranges from RMB39,000 in 1998 to RMB60,000 in 
2000. CEO pay is much lower than in developed countries (see, for example, Core et al., (1999) for 
the U.S.; Conyon (1997) for the U.K.; Zhou (1999) for Canada; Firth et al. (1999) for Hong Kong). 
Although low by standards in the West, CEO compensation in China is approximately twelve times 
higher than the average worker. This differential between the CEO’s pay and the average worker is 
much higher than in some other developing countries (Jones and Mygind, 2004). 
Please Insert Table 2 Here 
The accounting performance measures (ROA) are very poor and show a deteriorating trend. In 
contrast, however, stock returns (RETURN) are reasonable in 1998 and 1999 and very good in 2000. 
It is clear that ROA and RETURN give very different indicators of a firm’s financial performance and 
they will have different pay-performance sensitivities for CEO pay. They give different indicators of 
performance for a number of reasons. Stock prices are forward looking and incorporate investors’ 
expectations for the future; in contrast, ROA is a historical number. On the other hand, stock prices 
  
 
 
are affected by interest rate changes and monetary policy, which is something the managers do not 
have control over.   
 The state is the largest single shareholder in about 56% of the observations (STATE = 0.56). 
The variable OUTSIDE has yearly medians of 9% (2000), 9% (1999), and 8% (1998).   The 
combined shareholdings of the second through tenth largest shareholder are generally much lower 
than the ownership by the largest shareholder and so the largest shareholder has control over, or 
substantial influence on, the listed firm. The proportion of the non-executive directors is about 50% 
and this is comparable to the ratio of non-executive directors in the U.S. (Core et al., 1999), Britain 
(Ezzamel and Watson, 1997), and Hong Kong (Firth et al., 1999). The mean board size is nine . As a 
comparison, the average board size for U.S. companies is 13 (Core et al., 1999) and 9 for U.K. 
companies (Ezzamel and Watson, 1997). Board size is therefore comparable to those observed in 
developed countries. In 1998, approximately 32% of the board chairmen also held the position of 
chief executive officer, but this ratio reduces to 22% in 1999 and 16% in 2000. The reduction in the 
percentage of the dual roles is the result of an administrative instruction made in 1998 that requested 
firms to separa te the roles of chairman and CEO. As a comparison, Conyon (1997) reports 23% of 
firms have dual CEO and chairman roles in his U.K. sample. 
5.2. Regression results 
The regression results are shown in Table 3. In panel A, we use return on assets (ROA) as our 
prime performance measure, while in panel B we use stock return (RETURN).  Model 1 shows the 
results for performance (ROA, RETURN ), model 2 adds ownership and board variables, model 3 adds 
performance interaction terms, model 4 adds control variables (but no interactions), and model 5 is 
the full model. The interaction terms are used to investigate whether specific ownership structures are 
associated with performance-related pay for the CEO. Correlations among the independent variables 
are low to moderate (for example, all correlations are less than an absolute value of 0.40). We also 
  
 
 
compute variance inflation factors for each variable and they are all below 3.5. These diagnostic 
statistics suggest that multicollinearity is not a major problem in our models. 
Please Insert Table 3 Here 
We find that lagged ROA is significantly and positively associated with CEO PAY (panel A). 
Note, however, that ROA alone explains just 2% of the variability in CEO PAY (model 1). The 
evidence supports hypothesis 1. In panel B, however, we find no relation between pay and lagged 
stock return. The coefficients on STATE and OUTSIDE  are negative and statistically significant, 
while the coefficients on FOREIGN are positive and statistically significant. The results provide 
support for hypotheses 2, 3, and 4. Firms with large boards pay their CEOs less and this result is 
statistically significant. Thus the null hypothesis for BOARD is rejected. The coefficients on 
NONEXEC and DUAL are not significant.  
ROAt-1*FOREIGN has positive and significant coefficients in Table 3, panel A. Thus we find 
evidence that foreign- invested companies give more weight to a firm’s profitability when deciding on 
the CEO’s pay. The other performance-ownership interaction terms are not significant in panels A 
and B. Moreover, the STATE interaction terms have positive coefficients, which contrast with our 
expectations.  
In panel A, the coefficients on ROAt-1*NONEXEC are positive and significant, which 
indicates that firms that have a high proportion of non-executive  directors are more likely to relate 
their CEO’s pay to accounting-based performance. In contrast, the coefficients on RETURNt-
1*NONEXEC are not significant (see panel B). Firms where the CEO and the chairman is the same 
person, place less weight on performance as a criterion in setting the CEO’s compensation (see panel 
A). Board size has no statistically significant impact on whether a CEO’s pay is based on 
performance.  
  
 
 
As expected, firm size is positive and highly significant. The debt (DEBT ) variable is 
statistically significant in panel A but not in panel B. GROWTH and RISK are not significant. The 
addition of the governance factors (ownership and board structure) increase R-squares to about 12 
percent in panel A and 9 percent in panel B. The inclusion of the interaction terms (ownership and 
performance) marginally improves the adjusted R-squares. Most significant of all, the addition of the 
operating characteristics and location and industry control factors increase the R-squares from 12 
percent to about 37 percent in panel A (9 percent to 32 percent in panel B) and so these factors 
account for the bulk of the explanatory power of the model.  
We also test our models where performance, size, growth, and debt are measured 
contemporaneously. The results are similar to those shown in Table 3. In further sensitivity tests we 
use the percentage of shares owned by the state (%STATE) and the percentage owned by foreigners 
(%FOREIGN) in place of STATE and FOREIGN. The results from using %STATE and %FOREIGN 
in the regression models are qualitatively the same as the results from using the indicator variables 
STATE and FOREIGN. We also include FOREIGN and %FOREIGN in the same regression; 
FOREIGN is significant and %FOREIGN is marginally significant. From these results we conclude 
that the mere presence of foreign investors increases the CEO pay and the percentage of shares 
owned by foreigners is of lesser importance. Given the rapidly changing nature of the Chinese 
economy and the frequent changes in regulations, we also run regressions on yearly data (i.e., 
separate regressions for 1998, 1999, and 2000 data). The results are similar to those shown in Table 3. 
Thus inter-temporal differences are slight. 
To confirm our results on the pay- for-performance relation we examine the sensitivity of 
compensation to performance by regressing change in pay on change in operating profitability and 
stock return. We also estimate the elasticity of compensation with respect to performance by 
regressing the change in the log of CEO pay on the change in the log of performance. We include 
  
 
 
controls for STATE, OUTSIDE , FOREIGN, NONEXEC, BOARD, and DUAL. The results show 
significant pay sensitivities and elasticities for ROAt-1 but not for RETURNt-1. When we include 
interaction terms in the models we find that the pay-performance sensitivities and elasticities are 
positive and significant for ROAt-1*FOREIGN and ROA t-1*NONEXEC. ROAt-1*DUAL has negative 
coefficients. 
6. Discussion 
We find that a CEO’s compensation depends, in part, on the firm’s performance. In particular, 
compensation is greater when return on assets is high. However, there is no association between stock 
return and a CEO’s pay. The emphasis on operating profits to help determine a CEO’s pay, rather 
than stock returns, contrasts w ith U.S. practice. Stock returns tend to move together in China (Morck 
et al., 2000) reflecting market-wide factors; firm specific factors have less influence on stock prices. 
We therefore believe firms are reluctant to reward CEOs on the basis of stock returns and, instead, 
use accounting-based measures of performance.  Foreign- invested companies are more likely to base 
the CEO’s pay on the firm’s operating profitability. 
The type of owner seems to matter in explaining CEO pay; state controlled firms pay less and 
foreign-invested firms pay more. CEOs of firms controlled by the state are often state bureaucrats and 
they are paid in line with the senior civil servant salary levels. The trend is for the state to reduce its 
ownership and for there to be more foreign investment in listed firms as China opens up its economy. 
Moreover, the labor market is becoming more liquid with a greatly expanded pool of managerial 
talent. All this suggests that CEO pay will rise in the coming years and fewer bureaucrats will occupy 
the CEO position.  
Large board size appears to constrain CEO pay although the exact reasons for this are 
unknown. Boards with a large proportion of non-executive directors are more likely to implement 
performance-related pay schemes for their CEOs (performance based on operating profits). Thus, the 
  
 
 
independent or non-executive directors help to align the interests of shareholders and the CEO via the 
compensation of the CEO. When one person is both the CEO and the chairman he or she has a lot of 
power (and they can become entrenched). Our results show that firms with a dual CEO/chairman 
place far less weight on performance-related pay. The performance (ROA) and boardroom 
interactions show that the internal governance structure does play a role in incentivizing top 
management by making CEO pay contingent on the firm’s performance. 
7. Conclusion 
A central theme of the debate on top management pay is whether compensation is related to 
firm performance. This question is very important in China because merit based pay was an alien 
concept under the central planning system that existed prior to the economic reforms. We find a 
positive relation between CEO compensation and performance based on return on assets (ROA). 
Ownership structure has a significant influence on pay. In particular, firms with substantial 
government ownership and firms with large outside investors have lower CEO compensation. The 
presence of a foreign shareholder is associated with higher CEO pay. There is statistically significant 
evidence consistent with foreign shareholders pressuring firms to adopt performance-related pay 
schemes that are based on profitability. Firms with large boards pay their CEOs less and this result 
contrasts with the predictions of Jensen (1993). The results are consistent with non-executive 
directors, our proxy for independent directors, encouraging the use of performance-related pay while 
CEO/chairman duality reduces the use of performance-related compensation. 
One of the problems in carrying out empirical research on China’s listed firms is the paucity 
of data especially when compared to North America and some Western nations. For example, unlike 
some other countries, total compensation is not broken down into salary, benefits, and bonuses. We 
do not know for sure if bonuses are paid but we can infer them because of the statistical link between 
operating profitability and compensation (and because of evidence from studies that use survey data 
  
 
 
on SOEs). We cannot identify independent directors in our sample (the data do not become available 
until 2003) and so we use non-executive directors as a proxy. Another limitation of our study is that 
the compensation of the CEO is not directly given. Therefore we assume the highest paid executive is 
the CEO. These and other limitations can be overcome in the future as and when more detailed 
disclosure is made.  
While China’s economic growth is envied by many, the profitability of individual listed firms 
has been lamentable. One cause of poor performance is the lack of incentives for top management. 
We therefore believe it is crucial that CEOs be rewarded on the basis of their firms’ performances. 
One policy implication of our study is that firms should increase the number of truly independent 
non-executive directors on the board. We believe this will result in a greater use of performance-
based pay for the CEO. Another implication of the study is that firms should be discouraged from 
having a joint CEO/chairman as this reduces the use of performance-based pay. Unlike other 
countries, stock options are not granted in China. The lack of executive stock options is a missing 
ingredient in the design of incentive systems that align the interests of managers and investors3. This 
is something that the Chinese government and its economic planners need to redress. The lack of 
stock options as a reward mechanism is exacerbated by the very low share ownership by CEOs and 
top executives. To reap the full rewards of privatization, the state needs to step back from using 
political considerations in appointing and controlling CEOs. A thoroughly independent appointments 
committee may help in this regard. Allied to this, however, there must be a concerted effort to 
improve the incentives and rewards for CEOs. Without adequate top management rewards, the efforts 
exerted in economic restructuring may be in vain.  
                                                               
3 Note, however, that executive stock options do not always lead to improved future performance (McGuire and Matta, 
2003). 
  
 
 
Governments and other stakeholders should encourage firms, or even mandate them, to 
provide more extensive financial disclosures on top executive pay. The increasing autonomy given to 
managers needs to be balanced with more accountability and transparency. Good corporate 
governance mechanisms can do a lot to enhance the effectiveness of the CEO. Improving financial 
transparency help s investors in their monitoring and oversight roles.   
China’s listed firms are evolving fast as are its business practices and corporate governance. 
These rapid changes provide a lot of scope for future research. Increasing disclosure by firms (e.g., 
the breakdown of pay into base salary and bonuses) and by the state reducing constraints on the forms 
of CEO pay (e.g., stock options) will facilitate future research in CEO pay.  China’s brand of 
economic reforms is exportable to other developing countries. However before this happens, more 
scientific study is necessary so that we have a better understanding of how the reforms work and how 
they impact incentives and rewards. 
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 TABLE 1 
Variable Definitions, Proxies, and their Predicted Relationships  
Variables  Definition 
Compensation   
Executive 
compensation 
CEO PAY Natural log of the cash payment 
   
Performance   
Return on assets ROA Operating profit /total assets  
Stock return RETURN Annual stock return 
   
Governance Structure    
State ownership STATE Equal to 1 if the state is the largest shareholder in the company  
Outside ownership   OUTSIDE Percentage of shares owned by the second largest to tenth largest stockholder  
Foreign share FOREIG
N 
Equal to 1 if the company issues foreign shares 
Board composition NONEXE
C 
Percentage of non-executive directors on the board 
Board size BOARD The number of directors on the board 
Duality DUAL Equal to 1 if the chairman also serves as the CEO 
   
Operating 
Characteristics 
  
Firm size  SIZE Natural log of total assets  
Equity risk RISK Standard deviation of monthly stock returns over 12 months 
Growth opportunity  GROWT
H 
Market value/book value of assets 
Long term debt ratio  DEBT Book value of long term debt/book value of shareholders’ equity 
   
Other Variables   
Area 1 AREA1 Equal to 1 for companies registered in Shanghai or Shenzhen 
 26 
Area 2 AREA2 Equal to 1 for companies registered in the coastal provinces including Beijing 
and Tianjin  
Area 3 AREA3 Equal to 1 for companies registered in the inland provinces (i.e., except those in 
Areas 1, 2 & 4) 
Area 4 AREA4 Equal to 1 for companies registered in the less developed regions (including the  
provinces of Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Gansu, Qinghai, Xinjiang, Tibet, Yunnan 
and Guizhou)  
Industry 1 IND1 Equal to 1 for the utilities sector 
Industry 2 IND2 Equal to 1 for the properties sector 
Industry 3 IND3 Equal to 1 for the conglomerates (composites) sector 
Industry 4 IND4 Equal to 1 for the industrial and manufacturing sector 
Industry 5 IND5 Equal to 1 for the commercial sector 
 
 
 27 
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics  
Variables Year Mean  Median Min Max Standard 
Deviation 
CEO PAY (000s) 2000 85 60 9 1000 86.83 
 1999 69 50 9 660 73.97 
 1998 52 39 8 446 47.68 
Firm Characteristics       
Net Income (million) 2000 45 32 -934 1523 157 
 1999 43 31 -956 835 124 
 1998 36 32 -1044 2004 155 
Sales (million) 2000 918 442 0 20467 1679 
 1999 780 368 -30 14386 1363 
 1998 697 327 -52 11602 1205 
Assets (million) 2000 1706 1083 114 22099 2152 
 1999 1534 914 123 21908 2075 
 1998 1422 853 119 22209 2017 
Shareholders' Funds (million) 2000 811 507 -1334 13817 1245 
 1999 728 441 -1299 12958 1170 
 1998 693 429 -320 12581 1072 
Performance        
Operating profitability % (ROA) 2000 2.83 4.53 -91.20 29.82 9.81 
 1999 3.41 4.87 -49.83 34.21 8.70 
 1998 3.90 5.12 -41.62 35.10 8.34 
Stock Return % (RETURN) 2000 74.31 63.93 -28.80 440.16 56.26 
 1999 22.23 13.09 -45.07 391.29 42.96 
 1998 13.49 7.35 -53.66 413.78 45.26 
Ownership and Board 
Structure  
      
State Ownership (STATE) 2000 0.56 1 0 1 0.50 
 1999 0.55 1 0 1 0.50 
 1998 0.57 1 0 1 0.50 
Outside Ownership  (OUTSIDE) 2000 0.16 0.09 0.03 0.74 0.21 
 1999 0.17 0.09 0.02 0.73 0.20 
 1998 0.17 0.08 0.02 0.71 0.20 
Foreign Share Ownership 
(FOREIGN) 
2000 0.16 0 0 1 0.37 
 1999 0.16 0 0 1 0.37 
 1998 0.16 0 0 1 0.37 
Board Composition (NONEXEC) 2000 0.51 0.56 0 1 0.26 
 1999 0.50 0.56 0 1 0.26 
 1998 0.52 0.56 0 1 0.29 
Board Size (BOARD) 2000 9.46 9 5 18 2.62 
 1999 9.66 9 5 19 2.73 
 1998 9.73 9 5 19 2.86 
Duality (DUAL) 2000 0.16 0 0 1 0.37 
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 1999 0.22 0 0 1 0.41 
 1998 0.32 0 0 1 0.47 
Operating Characteristics        
SIZE (log of total assets) 2000 7.01 6.98 4.74 10.00 0.88 
 1999 6.89 6.81 4.81 9.99 0.87 
 1998 6.83 6.75 4.78 10.01 0.85 
Equity Risk (RISK ) 2000 0.12 0.11 0.03 0.67 0.07 
 1999 0.15 0.13 0.02 0.45 0.07 
 1998 0.12 0.12 0.04 2.01 0.28 
GROWTH 2000 3.69 3.14 0 18.27 2.39 
 1999 2.47 2.12 0 13.19 1.53 
 1998 2.62 1.95 0 24.21 4.87 
Long term debt/equity ratio 2000 0.11 0.03 -2.59 2.01 0.29 
 (DEBT) 1999 0.07 0.01 -2.81 6.32 0.39 
 1998 0.13 0.04 -0.25 3.78 0.27 
 
 
 
TABLE 3 
Regression of Compensation on Performance, Ownership, and Board Characteristics 
[reduce regression coefficients and intercepts to two decimal places] 
Panel A: Performance is measured by ROA  t-1 
 
Variables  1 2 3 4 5 
Intercept  4.790*** 
(28.029) 
4.294*** 
(24.251) 
4.306*** 
(18.955) 
2.536*** 
(13.871) 
2.507*** 
(13.632) 
Performance      
ROA  t-1 0.110** 
(2.328) 
0.113** 
(2.168) 
0.097** 
(2.067) 
0.123*** 
(3.488) 
0.118** 
(2.194) 
Ownership and Board 
Structure  
     
STATE  -0.179*** 
(-4.339) 
-0.201*** 
(-4.320) 
-0.181*** 
(-4.937) 
-0.219*** 
(-5.070) 
OUTSIDE  -0.395** 
(-2.170) 
-0.258*** 
(-2.991) 
-0.331*** 
(-3.466) 
-0.317*** 
(-4.695) 
FOREIGN  0.366*** 
(3.402) 
0.352*** 
(2.841) 
0.145** 
(2.689) 
0.135** 
(2.503) 
NONEXEC  0.073 
(0.902) 
0.068 
(0.833) 
-0.082 
(-1.114) 
-0.089 
(-1.196) 
BOARD    -0.026* 
(-1.890) 
-0.025** 
(-2.361) 
-0.037*** 
(-4.127) 
-0.034*** 
(-5.074) 
DUAL   0.118 
(1.444) 
0.119 
(1.455) 
0.015 
(0.352) 
-0.018 
(-0.391) 
Performance Interactions      
ROA  t-1*STATE   0.039 
(1.002) 
 0.016 
(1.308) 
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ROA  t-1*OUTSIDE   0.013 
(0.341) 
 0.036 
(0.412) 
ROA  t-1*FOREIGN   0.011* 
(1.907) 
 0.012** 
(1.963) 
ROA t-1*NONEXEC   0.107** 
(2.136) 
 0.115** 
(2.003) 
ROA t-1*BOARD   0.009 
(1.366) 
 0.007 
(0.985) 
ROA t-1*DUAL   -0.013* 
(-1.741) 
 -0.008** 
(-1.967) 
Operating Characteristics       
SIZE     0.254*** 
(10.479) 
0.256*** 
(10.495) 
RISK     0.159 
(0.511) 
0.213 
(0.672) 
GROWTH    0.007 
(1.211) 
0.005 
(1.288) 
DEBT     -0.146** 
(-2.396) 
-0.144** 
(-2.330) 
Other variables      
AREA    Ö Ö 
IND    Ö Ö 
YEAR    Ö Ö 
Adjusted R2 0.02 0.117 0.126 0.345 0.366 
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Panel B: Performance is measured by RETURN  t-1 
 
Intercept  4.207 
(40.723) 
4.358*** 
(27.249) 
4.375*** 
(27.156) 
2.410*** 
(11.238) 
2.439*** 
(11.184) 
Performance      
RETURN  t-1 0.007 
(0.133) 
0.009 
(0.179) 
0.086 
(0.516) 
0.048 
(0.621) 
0.017 
(0.214) 
Ownership and Board 
Structure  
     
STATE  -0.161*** 
(-3.215) 
-0.182*** 
(-3.337) 
-0.164*** 
(-3.717) 
-0.198*** 
-(4.027) 
OUTSIDE  -0.401*** 
(-3.026) 
-0.358*** 
(-3.201) 
-0.435*** 
(-3.297) 
-0.313*** 
(-3.004) 
FOREIGN  0.535*** 
(3.138) 
0.573*** 
(3.262) 
0.117** 
(2.033) 
0.150** 
(2.217) 
NONEXEC  0.054 
(0.551) 
0.051 
(0.516) 
-0.106 
(-1.197) 
-0.113 
(-1.207) 
BOARD    -0.022 
(-1.393) 
-0.021 
(-1.362) 
-0.032*** 
(-3.863) 
-0.032*** 
(-3.808) 
DUAL   -0.021 
(-0.325) 
-0.016 
(-0.252) 
0.064 
(1.127) 
0.062 
(1.095) 
Performance Interactions      
RETURN  t-1*STATE   0.113 
(1.017) 
 0.149 
(1.573) 
RETURN  t-1*OUTSIDE   0.137 
(1.294) 
 0.006 
(0.081) 
RETURN  t-1*FOREIGN   0.366 
(1.474) 
 0.286 
(1.595) 
RETURN  t-1*NONEXEC   0.009 
(0.832) 
 0.012 
(0.893) 
RETURN  t-1*BOARD   0.003 
(0.480) 
 0.001 
(0.385) 
RETURN  t-1*DUAL   -0.006 
(-0.814) 
 -0.013 
(-1.264) 
Operating Characteristics       
SIZE     0.277*** 
(9.866) 
0.280*** 
(9.853) 
RISK    0.047 
(0.136) 
0.041 
(0.119) 
GROWTH    0.004 
(0.769) 
0.005 
(0.749) 
DEBT     -0.095 
(-1.317) 
-0.097 
(-1.361) 
Other variables      
AREA    Ö Ö 
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IND    Ö Ö 
YEAR    Ö Ö 
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.086 0.089 0.316 0.317 
 
Table 3 shows the coefficients from a regression using the following model: 
CEO PAY  = a  + b1PERFORMANCEt-1 + b2OWNERSHIP + b3BOARD 
STRUCTURE   + b4 OPERATING CHARACTERISTICS  + b5 CONTROL 
FACTORS   +e. 
CEO PAY = the natural log of cash payment; ROA = operating profit in year t-1 divided by total 
assets; RETURN = annual stock return in year t-1; STATE = a dummy variable coded one (1) if 
the state is the largest shareholder in the company; OUTSIDE = percentage of shares owned by 
the second largest to tenth largest shareholder; FOREIGN = a dummy variable  equal to one (1) if 
the company has issued foreign shares; NONEXEC = the proportion of unpaid directors to total 
number of directors on the board; BOARD = the number of directors on the board; DUAL = a 
dummy variable if the chairman also serves as CEO; SIZE = the natural log of total assets; RISK 
= the standard deviation of the monthly stock return; GROWTH = the ratio of market value to 
book value of assets; DEBT = book value of the long term debt to book value of the 
shareholders’ equity.  
Ö indicates area, industry, and year controls (AREA, IND, YEAR) have been included. 
t-statistics are provided in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 
0.01 levels, (two tailed test 
 
